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Abstract
It is generally claimed that there exist exceptional circumstances when taking human life may be
approved and when such actions may be justified on moral grounds. Precise guidelines in the
medical field for making such decisions concerning patients who are terminally ill or have
irreparable injuries incompatible with a bearable life, are difficult to establish. Recommendations
that take the particular logical form of a rule, such as "in dubio pro vita", "when in doubt favour
life") have been suggested and in some countries incorporated into legal texts (Germany). We claim
here that such a rule is of no value since it is open-ended and always allows for doubt, and a decision
to employ measures that would support human life could always be argued to be a valid choice.
Preservation of this rule could be encouraged, but giving it the force of law may put physicians at
risk, as they may be challenged for choosing to terminate life in otherwise ethically and medically
uncontroversial circumstances.
Background
Medical personnel can face extremely difficult choices
when confronted with a patient for whom life saving or
life prolonging measures do not seem justified. They are
advised to then use a simple rule viz. in dubio pro vita –
"when in doubt, favor life". The intention of this paper is
to expose the concealed logical structure of the rule in
dubio pro vita, demonstrate its theoretical shortcomings,
and present hypothetical practical difficulties for using it
not only as a "rule" but in particular as a "rule" having the
force of law, in Germany, for example [1]. Our aim, there-
fore, is to explore ethical aspects of the logic of the rule as
well as relevant legal interpretations. We will leaving aside
issues which are largely discussed elsewhere, including
those in basic ethical textbooks or books and articles on
the clinical application of medical ethics.
Indeed, the question as to whether killing could be mor-
ally justified has a very long history. In modern times this
problem arises when trying to justify ending the life of ter-
minally ill patients – such patients now comprise the
majority of intensive care units (ICU) deaths [2] – or of
those with irreparable injuries incompatible with a beara-
ble life. In practice a utilitarian approach to ending life has
replaced a deontological approach which, in its strongest
form, would forbid any termination of human life. None-
theless, a practical and uncontroversial guide for deciding
when to end someone's life is not available, even in situa-
tions involving patients who might be considered for life
termination (some emergency or ICU patients) and who
would certainly die from their condition. Furthermore,
the routines, customs, limitations and practices vary sub-
stantially between countries [3], and the mere defining of
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a condition that would indisputably allow life termina-
tion cannot be agreed upon. Scholarly debate reflects the
struggle to define such a life terminating condition [4-6],
and debate persists as to whether life termination condi-
tions even exist [7,8]. Consequently life termination can
always be questioned, even with the most precise defini-
tions. In principle, no form of consequentialism – which
prescribes that our actions should be guided by their con-
sequences – can provide a right answer for what ought to
be done, since there is no certainty as to how various
agents (people), whose behavior one cannot control,
would behave [9-12]. As a result, uncertainty, no matter
how minor in degree, remains. We will not, in this manu-
script, further focus upon consequentialism, apart from
the above-mentioned problem of calculation and the pre-
diction of outcomes in a human discipline such as medi-
cine. In natural sciences, such as physics, events are often
highly predictable. On the other hand, when consequen-
tial calculations involve the prediction of social events
(medical science may be of some special kind close to
social sciences), our predictive power is very low [14-16].
Therefore, consequentialists' aims are hypothetical in
principle. Indeed, for our actions to be justified by their
ends (consequential logic), it must be certain not only
that the ends are right and good but that they would be
right if they increased the good [13], and furthermore that
they occur with certainty. If they do not, we will then be
basing our actions on mere intentions, i.e. predictions
that may not ensue. It is then not the benefits of the out-
come that justifies consequentialist actions but the inten-
tions – and precisely here is where consequentialist
morality fails. This weak point of consequentialism (and
utilitarianism, which is a special case of consequential-
ism), was seen very early and by a number of critics, some
of whom were quite famous, as, for example, in the late
19th century, Nietzsche, or more recently, Bernard Wil-
liams and John Rawls. Nietzsche, in his "The Will to
Power," dating from 1888 [9], mentions utilitarianism
and comments with doubt that consequences can be
known. John Rawls repeatedly expresses concern in his
"Theory of Justice" [10] about the difficulties of calculat-
ing utility and prediction in utilitarian arguments. Also, in
his "Political Liberalism" [11], Rawls, referring to teleo-
logical theories of justice, states that: "... the form of pub-
lic reasoning they specify tends to be politically
unworkable..." and, referring to consequentialists calcula-
tions of benefits, remarks on the "...highly speculative
nature and enormous complexity of these calculations..."
Another moral philosopher who objects to utilitarianism,
and specifically considers the problem of prediction of
desired events is the above mentioned Bernard Williams
(in the introductory paragraphs of the first and second
section of his text) [12].
The following example may help the reader better appre-
ciate the circumstances in medical practice. In serious sit-
uations, for example after a car accident with multiple
trauma to thorax and extremities as well as head injury
with basilar skull fractures, a physician may have to
decide, in the face of considerable doubt about how to
handle the situation, whether to continue life support or
not. One might imagine that heroic, immediate maximal
care – with extensive surgery and all possible imaginable
medical measures – could be life saving for an unknown
small number of these patients who would otherwise die.
Often it is clear to the practicing emergency physician
(whom we can describe as "skeptical") that all of this is in
reality unavailable and that "there is no doubt" that the
patient would be lost anyway – so in such cases further
intensive life saving measures will not be administered.
Exactly at that point an "optimist" may have a different
opinion and this would be enough for the controversy to
take on an ominous dimension. These cases exist in the
practice of emergency medicine and in the ICU, but they
almost never surface in public because of their extreme
ambiguity which is fully appreciated by medical person-
nel.
In an effort to reduce uncertainty in practical patient care,
some "precise" rules have been established. Ideally, deci-
sions to continue or discontinue life should be reviewed
by a collective of experts. However, it is maintained that
expert opinion be based on a lengthy, elaborate education
and years of training [17,18]. Medical personnel with var-
ious degrees of competence, experience and medical
expertise are continually facing problems associated with
terminal care [4,5,19] or with emergency care. Expert
group consultation is not always possible, thereby creat-
ing a need for more simple and reliable life support guide-
lines. Yet, over-defining the rules for such situations, we
will argue, may introduce the possibility of erroneous
decisions. Introducing such rules into the law may even
worsen the situation, since all that would be achieved
would be the transfer of an ambiguity from an everyday
life context to a judicial context.
To provide a practical rule, the last resort of consequen-
tialism has been an adaptation of the rules prescribed in
other fields. The rule "in dubio pro reo" ("when in doubt,
favour the accused"), probably derived from Roman law,
has been extended to environmental issues, for example,
the rule "in dubio pro natura" ("when in doubt, favor
nature") [18] and finally in medical ethics, to the rule in
dubio pro vita ("when in doubt, favor life"). Some Euro-
pean legislatures have gone so far as to incorporate in
dubio pro vita as a legal term (Germany) [1,20-22]. As we
will see in what follows, there are logical, epistemic and
legal objections to the tendencies to give the aforemen-
tioned rule the force of law. The claim that we criticize is
that the rule in dubio pro vita is of practical help to the med-
ical personnel deciding about the cessation or continua-
tion of life support. Quite to the contrary, we claim thatPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:6 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/6
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incorporating the rule in dubio pro vita in positive law may
offer false and dangerous security to medical practitioners
when they are dealing with the terminally ill or untreata-
ble severely injured patients. Alternatively, it may lead to
unreasonable attempts to maintain life in these patients,
since the rule may be interpreted as forbidding every ter-
mination of life support.
Logic and reality of in dubio pro vita
When considering whether or not to support human life,
the decision has to be based on morally acceptable rea-
sons, including the patient's desires, together with existen-
tial reasons, including medical reasons such as absence of
mental activity, certainty that life could not be prolonged,
etc. If certainty is not there (i.e. doubt exists), in dubio pro
vita prescribes that one has to favor life. Or similarly, if
one is not in doubt but others are, whether a family mem-
ber or a legal or moral authority, then some degree of
doubt exists and one should again favour life. One should
then, by acting or not acting, permitprolongation of life.
Otherwise, if absolutely no doubt exists, and all impor-
tant conditions are satisfied (including that the positive
laws permit such acts), one may passively or even actively
(quite exclusively in some countries) terminate life. We
argue that, on grounds of formal logic, unfortunately, the
cited "rule" is not a useful "rule" at all, since one end (the
alternative) is left "open" and the option "pro vita" always
applies. The argument itself hasthe logical form of a modus
ponens and it would be correct, by confirming the anteced-
ent (premise), to conclude that life should be maintained,
i.e., "there is doubt, so life should be maintained". On the
contrary, although one could deny the antecedent, which
would be to state that "there is no doubt", i.e. it is useless
to try to maintain life, to imply that "life should not be
maintained", would be a fallacy (which is the well known
"fallacy of denying the antecedent"). It could be con-
cluded that the logical structure of the argument itself
does not offer much of a choice and the reasons for not
maintaining the lives of the terminally ill patients should
be looked for in the real world.
Therefore, we also wish to briefly consider the issue in the
context of the real world, not in a simple logical frame-
work. Indeed, it appears obvious that if one could only be
sure as to when there is  doubt and when there is no
doubt, the above logical problems and probably all the
problems of decision making would be solved. In the con-
text of the real world, we suspect there is always some
degree of doubt and one cannot create even a hypothetical
situation where, when making a decision to terminate life,
absolutely no doubt would exist. What is at issue here is,
after all, not "doubt" itself, but the content of the doubt:
whether the life of the terminally ill patient should be
maintained or not. To decide this, one would have to
reach a certain degree of certainty. While it appears to be
of little importance to determine just how much one is
certain that "doubt is present" (since in these circum-
stances, life maintenance measures would be undertaken
anyway), it seems extremely important to determine
exactly how certain it is that there is "no doubt" (since life
cessation measures would be undertaken only if the cer-
tainty were to be absolute). Therefore let us examine the
latter in some detail. However, we have to draw the
reader's attention to the fact that events or entities which
have a continuous nature if described as graded may carry
a risk of arbitrary divisions that may be later overseen, and
then a danger of a "slippery slope" [23] might appear as
soon as some of the steps are challenged. The epistemic
hierarchy offers an illustration of both kinds of difficul-
ties.
If one considers the "Thirteen Steps" of the epistemic hier-
archy (Appendix) [24] it is clear that one can, for example,
place the proposition "there is no doubt" at position -4
(i.e. "it is evidently false that there is no  doubt"; the
emphasis is always ours) and still not be justified in dis-
carding doubt completely. Some degree of doubt would
persist even if one asserts, "it is certainly false that there is
no  doubt" (position -6). Here also we cannot say that
doubt is excluded completely. Although one may make
such an assertion, one can never be sure that it corre-
sponds entirely to reality. The reason for this is that in real
life we refer to the external world about which we can
never have complete knowledge.
Indeed, the concept of certainty refers to our personal
epistemological stance and not to an omniscient stance.
Our personal conviction of how the world appears to be
may not faithfully mirror how the world really is, and
while one person may be certain about some matter,
another may not be so certain. Regardless of how low the
probability, even if it is infinitesimally small, its realiza-
tion will always be theoretically possible – and doubt will
forever lurk. If one were to act only then when in absolute
certainty of what one is doing and when one is certain
about the consequences of the acts, one would presuma-
bly never act. We act most of the time within large
amounts of uncertainty and the results of our actions,
sometimes, surprise us, or could even bring us, unexpect-
edly again, into opposition with our rigid legal system.
The reality of the world and, as we have seen, logic,
deceive us when we try to act according to our reason and
in accord with nature. We will see that our humanly made
systems of guidelines, more precisely, our legal system,
can not be of much help either.
Legal aspects
The rule "in dubio pro reo" – a merciful legal rule that
favours the accused – does not suffer from the same short-
comings. In principle, tribunals apply law, not necessarilyPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:6 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/6
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justice, while on the contrary, with the application of in
dubio pro vita, justice is expected. Should in dubio pro vita
become law, and if "in dubio" were to be interpreted as
"reasonable doubt" (Appendix), this being a quite weak
assertion, it would in all likelihood increase legal life ces-
sation and make it more frequent, thereby increasing erro-
neous decisions. On the other hand, a more restricted
interpretation of the rule would be "beyond any doubt"
("certain", Appendix), which has apparently occurred in
Germany, where active life termination is practically for-
bidden.
However, the legal criterion "beyond reasonable doubt"
suffers (in theory) from similar shortcomings of interpre-
tation. Yet those who consider the rule "beyond reasona-
ble doubt" are typically a collective (judges, jury) and not
a single person (as is the case for medical personnel).
Judges are not liable if wrong, although their decisions
may be challenged some later instance. If a judge's deci-
sion is challenged and overruled, she/he suffers no legal
consequence. On the contrary, a physician's decision to
terminate life may be legally challenged and the physician
may be held responsible. Death penalty decisions are per-
haps the most similar to a physician's decision to termi-
nate life, but these decisions have one major difference.
Apart from what has already been mentioned about judi-
cial decisions, death penalty decisions can (almost)
always be reconsidered with an appeal, not only in theory
but also in practice. Whereas an initial decision by a phy-
sician to terminate human life is without appeal and is
usually acted upon immediately.
Natural and positive justice
Indeed, it may appear to a reader that we maintain that
giving the force of law to such decisions may automati-
cally introduce injustice. People are, nevertheless, often
inclined to identify law with justice. What is often
observed is not that "justice has been done" but that "law
has been applied" and consequently then it is seen (!) as
"justice is being done".
However, if examined with more scrutiny, it is not diffi-
cult to realize that law is an expression of the society and
of the political will and not only of how justice is appreci-
ated at a given point of time in history. That laws could be
unjust has been common experience in the past and is fre-
quent experience even today. For example, the opponents
of capital punishment maintain that the death penalty is
in fact unjust in principle. However, we do not always
agree with the cruel punishment of criminals that is a nor-
mal, lawful procedure in some countries. Indeed, the dis-
tinction between law and justice was recognized very early
[25,26]. Related to the context here, it is maintained that
if theoretical ambiguities are present, as they are with the
rule in dubio pro vita, then the possibilities of applying the
law without promoting our intuitive idea of justice, may
be increased.
On the one hand the physician understands that she/he
has to follow morally acceptable reasons. On the other
hand, in theory, she/he understands that to support life is
always a valid and defendable choice. The attending phy-
sician is not in a position to objectively determine when
there is "no doubt" and has only one valid and secure
option, to "go for life". Consequently, as a legal principle,
in dubio, pro vita would be empty – i.e. it offers little other
than to always support life. The proper interpretation of
that rule is that doubt may always obtain so the physician
does not have a choice. Some unfortunate physician who
might decide on moral and medical grounds that there is
"no doubt" that someone's life should be terminated in a
passive or an active way (it being given that legislation
would permit it), may find himself in a perilous situation
if just one sceptic were to challenge that decision – and
that sceptic happened to be her/his judge. If the rule is
ambiguous, giving it the force of law and then punishing
someone for not observing that law would not be just. To
promulgate a law that permits the false belief that there is
a choice – is unjust.
Summary
It has been argued in the present article that the guidelines
for life termination decisions should be carefully recon-
sidered. The moral rules should probably be given a slight
indeterministic turn in the sense of giving the advantages
to the judgments made according to the actual circum-
stances, over and above some a priori established strict
law-like set of regulations.
We contend that the rule, in dubio pro vita which has
gained popularity, at least in Europe, would be of no value
as law since it would be open-ended and always allow for
doubt. According to this "law" – if applied prudently – the
decision to take measures that maintain human life would
always be the single valid choice. Preservation of this rule
may be encouraged, but giving it the force of law might
represent a risk for medical personnel who choose not to
support human life in some otherwise morally, medically
and existentially uncontroversial circumstance. In other
words, such a decision may, at least in theory, be chal-
lenged even if the termination of life support is fully mor-
ally justified.
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Appendix
The 13 Steps of the epistemic justification hierarchy,
according to Chisholm R. [24]. This is a spectrum that
describes the degree of evidence supporting some propo-
sition, from 'certainly true' to 'certainly false"'.
6. Certain
5. Obvious
4. Evident
3. Beyond Reasonable Doubt
2. Epistemically in the Clear
1. Probable
0. Counterbalanced
-1. Probably False
-2. In the Clear to Disbelieve
-3. Reasonable to Disbelieve
-4. Evidently False
-5. Obviously False
-6. Certainly False
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